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I. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to parents, teachers, administrators, and coaches, a new set 
of eyes may soon be monitoring the children of the Lockport City School 
District (“Lockport” or “the District”).  Last year, Lockport, located in 
western New York, announced that it was in the process of installing over 
300 high-tech security cameras throughout their ten schools, all equipped 
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with Facial Recognition Technology (“FRT”).1  The District, using public 
funds granted to it by the Smart School Bond Act, originally proposed using 
nearly $3.3 million in order to fully implement the system.2  Lockport 
expressed that this implementation is a response to the increasingly 
dangerous classroom environment that American children have been 
subjected to in recent years; the FRT system is meant to enable school 
security to quickly respond to the appearance of threats, such as registered 
sex offenders, disgruntled employees, expelled students, or persons carrying 
weapons.3  Administrators believe that the system will be an effective means 
of thwarting serious threats like school shootings.4 
While student safety is unquestionably of grave importance, Lockport’s 
announcement was met with overwhelming backlash.5  Most voiced similar 
concerns over Lockport’s new system and the potential detrimental effects it 
may have on its students.6  One Lockport father, Jim Shultz, expressed his 
disdain for the system in an article published by the New York Times, 
labeling Lockport’s plan a “wasteful and dangerous experiment.”7 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Psychology with a 
concentration in Behavioral Neuroscience, Fairfield University, May 2016.  I would like to 
extend a special thank you to everyone involved in this comment, especially to my faculty 
advisor, Dean Brian Sheppard, and my Comment Editor Rakiah Bonjour.  I would also like 
to thank my parents, Joseph and Rosemarie LoSardo, for their relentless love and support in 
everything I do.   
 1   Thomas J. Prohaska, NYCLU Attacks Lockport Schools’ Facial Recognition Security 
Plan, THE BUFFALO NEWS (April 4, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/2018/09/03/nyclu-
attacks-lockport-schools-facial-recognition-security-plan. 
 2   See President John Linderman, Lockport Board of Education Proceedings of the 
Board of Education Minutes (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/lockport_board_meeting.pdf 
[hereinafter Lockport Minutes]; Smart Schools Q & A, New York State Educ. Dep’t. (2014) 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/archive/governor_files/documents/
SmartSchools-QandA-9-15.pdf (The Smart Schools Bond Act authorizes the issuance of $2 
billion to finance educational technology and infrastructure; spending must be approved by a 
state-wide vote before becoming effective. More recent reports indicate that Lockport has 
only moved forward with an initial implementation phase of $1.4 million thus far by installing 
the system); Kyle S. Mackie, NYS Education Department Now “Satisfied” With Lockport City 
School’s Facial Recognition Technology, WBFO BUFFALO’S NPR NEWS STATION (Nov. 27, 
2019), https://news.wbfo.org/post/nys-education-department-now-satisfied-lockport-city-
schools-facial-recognition-technology. 
 3   Associated Press, Schools Using Facial Recognition Tech to Boost Safety, N.Y. POST 
(July 23, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/07/23/schools-using-facial-recognition-tech-to-
boost-safety.   
 4   Id. 
 5   E.g., Prohaska, supra note 1.  
 6   Prohaska, supra note 1.  
 7   Jim Shultz, Spying on Children Won’t Keep Them Safe, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 
7, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/opinion/lockport-facial-recognition-
schools.html.  
LOSARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2020  10:47 AM 
2020] FACEOFF 375 
Of these groups, however, the most vocal and effective has been the 
New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”).8  Just months after Lockport 
announced its plan, the NYCLU began working to have the New York State 
Education Department (“NYSED”) withhold funding from the District in 
order to thwart the use of the technology completely.9  The group also urged 
the District to reconsider, arguing that the system’s implementation would 
create a host of social and privacy-related issues for its students.10  The 
NYCLU asserted that not only would FRT violate the protected privacy and 
civil liberty rights of the students of Lockport, but it would also negatively 
impact their learning environment.11  Socially, the organization asserted that 
the invasive nature of the surveillance would make students feel like 
criminals, decrease the leniency of minor offenses, and further the racial bias 
already prevalent in classrooms.12 
Perhaps more concerning is that Lockport began installing the system 
without informing parents, students, or faculty members of any limitations, 
restrictions, or protocol that would accompany the system.13  In her initial 
response, Lockport Superintendent Michele T. Bradley simply commented 
that all final protocols would be “guided by the interests of safety and 
security within the district and will be consistent with all applicable laws.”14  
NYCLU spokeswoman Naomi Dann argued that Lockport should have been 
transparent from the outset regarding both how the technology would be 
implemented, and the steps that the District would take to ensure that privacy 
and civil liberty rights would be safeguarded.15 
In addition to privacy concerns, Dann also stressed the need for 
protections against this sort of massive collection of data and the potential 
for it to be shared with law enforcement, immigration authorities, and other 
third-party agencies that may have an interest in obtaining such 
information.16  The NYCLU warns that exposing children and faculty to such 
an invasive technology will create the possibility that “innocent students will 
be misidentified and punished for things that they did not do” and transform 
 
 8   Letter from John A. Curr III, Western Reg. Office Dir. and Stefanie D. Coyle, Edu. 
Counsel, to MaryEllen Elia, NYS Edu. Dep. Commissioner, (June 18, 2018) (on file with 
author) (voicing the NYCLU’s concerns regarding FRT in the Lockport schools and urging 
the District to cease their efforts). 
 9   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
 10   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
 11   See Press Release, NYCLU, NYCLU Urges State to Block Facial Recognition 
Technology in Lockport Schools (June 18, 2018), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-
releases/nyclu-urges-state-block-facial-recognition-technology-lockport-schools.  
 12   Id.  
 13   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
 14   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3.   
 15   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
 16   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
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the school’s environment from “one of learning and exploration into one of 
suspicion and control.”17  The NYCLU then filed a lengthy Freedom of 
Information Law (“FOIL”) request with Lockport in order to generate 
material for its imminent report.18 
The activism of parents and groups such as the NYCLU has led to some 
progress.  Prior to the start of the 2019 school year, the NYSED delayed 
Lockport from fully implementing the system, requiring the District to make 
improvements and revisions to the protection of privacy in  future collected 
data.19  Lockport, however, remains determined to begin using the system at 
its full potential, indicating they will “continue to evaluate the timing for full 
implementation of the object and facial recognition components of the 
system.”20 
While the NYCLU’s relentless advocacy of fully thwarting Lockport’s 
plan has temporarily deterred the District, it is unlikely that it will ultimately 
prevent Lockport, or other schools throughout the country, from using such 
technologies.  The NYCLU’s main legal argument is that the use of FRT is 
a violation of the privacy rights of the students; however, under current 
jurisprudence, it is unlikely that FRT will infringe on a student’s right to 
privacy.21  Further, as current state and federal laws regarding biometric data 
collection are ill-equipped to protect adults from the nonconsensual use of 
FRT, they will undoubtedly be ineffective in protecting public school 
children, whose rights to privacy are substantially weakened.22  While the 
NYCLU has put forth a convincing list of potential negative implications 
revolving around the technology, it would be far too one-sided to not also 
consider the potential benefits this system could provide its students. 
 
 
 
 17   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
 18   Prohaska, supra note 1, at 3. 
 19   Madison Carter, I-Team: Lockport Schools Pull Faces From Facial Recognition 
System; Will Only Track Guns, NEWS 7 ABC BUFFALO WKBK (Sept. 9, 2019, 6:21 PM), 
https://www.wkbw.com/news/i-team/i-team-lockport-schools-pull-faces-from-facial-
recognition-system-will-only-track-guns (noting, presently, the system is only being used to 
monitor for guns).  
 20   Kyle S. Mackie, NYS Education Department Now “Satisfied” with Lockport City 
Schools’ Facial Recognition Technology, WBFO88.7 (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://news.wbfo.org/post/nys-education-department-now-satisfied-lockport-city-schools-
facial-recognition-technology.  
 21   Press Release, supra note 11.  
 22   See generally, Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do: 
Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
88 (2017) (discussing facial recognition’s ability to allow the government to track the 
movement of their citizenry in an “unprecedented fashion” and US courts’ inability to protect 
individuals from being tracked). 
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This comment takes a moderate approach in joining the nuanced debate 
that currently exists around the implementation of FRT within the American 
public school system.23  Though Lockport may be one of the first school 
districts fighting to implement FRT, it certainly will not be the last.24  
Recently, Seattle-based digital software company RealNetworks began 
offering a free version of its facial recognition system to schools 
nationwide.25  Thus, as the implementation of this technology becomes more 
prevalent and readily accessible to schools, it is crucial that the federal 
government views Lockport as an opportunity to create stricter regulations 
revolving around FRT, and establish safeguards that protect the intimate data 
that is being collected. 
Part II of this comment will provide a brief history of FRT; analyze 
FRT’s origin, the manner in which it processes, stores, and collects biometric 
data; and evaluate the ways in which it is currently being used in schools.  
Part III attempts to balance the technology’s prospective benefits with 
potential detrimental effects and abuses.  Parts IV and V consider current 
jurisprudence in terms of student privacy rights, a school’s duty to educate 
and protect its students, and federal policies that may protect collected 
student biometric data.  Ultimately, this comment seeks to demonstrate the 
current lack of regulation and protocol that are applicable to this developing 
and invasive technology in public school systems.  Further, it advocates for 
stricter federal regulations through amendments to preexisting federal laws, 
such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), as a 
plausible solution to promote safety while ensuring a reasonable degree of 
privacy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Creation and Evolution of FRT 
The notion of using one’s facial composition in order to identify 
unknown suspects is one that dates back to the nineteenth century.26  In 
essence, FRT is the natural evolution of centuries of law enforcement and 
governmental agencies expanding upon and attempting to perfect basic 
concepts of photo identification.27  Though the general public’s most 
prominent interaction with FRT may date back only a few years to Apple’s 
 
 23   This comment solely deals with FRT within public schools; private schools and the 
privacy rights of the faculty within the school systems are beyond the scope of this comment.  
 24   Associated Press, supra note 3. 
 25   Associated Press, supra note 3. 
 26   MARCUS SMITH, MONIQUE MANN & GREGOR URBAS, BIOMETRICS, CRIME AND 
SECURITY 54 (Routledge 2018). 
 27   Id. 
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novel use of the technology as a means of unlocking one’s iPhone, efforts in 
the development of FRT have been continuously made since the 1960s.28 
By the 1960s, technology had already been developed that could 
classify still photos of individuals by manually inputting measurements 
between facial features such as the eyes, nose, hairline, and mouth.29  In the 
1980s, algebraic techniques were then incorporated into the process so that 
FRT software required fewer than 100 measurements in order to effectively 
code a face.30  Finally, a massive expansion of FRT in the U.S. occurred in 
the 1990s when the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency 
(“DARPA”) sponsored The FacE REcognition Technology Evaluation 
(“FERET”) in order to ultimately propel the technology from infancy into 
the commercial market.31  Today, FRT is used widely by commercial entities 
in both the private and public sectors.32  The U.S. government uses the 
technology extensively in various sectors as a means to promote safety.33  
For example, FRT can be used as a means to combat passport fraud in 
airports, to support law enforcement in uncovering the identity of missing 
children, and to minimize identity fraud.34 
Essentially, most FRT software boils down to two fundamental 
processes: enrollment and matching.35  Most algorithms divide the face into 
distinctive nodal points that are individual to a person and will change 
minimally over time.36  FRT seeks out patterns using features such as eye 
sockets, nose shape, distances between unique features (like moles, spots, or 
glasses), skin texture, and weighted areas of the face.37  Collecting and 
imputing these data points is known as the enrollment phase, and it creates a 
digital “faceprint.”38  Next, FRT software compares this data to a preexisting 
database full of other facial models in order to identify an individual.39  The 
data collected in order to create these faceprints are a type of biometric data.  
Biometric data, most simply, refers to any “measurement of a physical 
 
 28   KELLY GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE, 27, (New York University Press, 2011). 
 29   Jesse D. West, A Brief History of Face Recognition, FACEFIRST (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.facefirst.com/blog/brief-history-of-face-recognition-software. 
 30   Id. 
 31   Id.  
 32   See generally id.  
 33   Id. 
 34   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BIOMETRICS, FACE 
RECOGNITION 93 (2014). [hereinafter FBI Biometrics] 
 35   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 7.  
 36   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 7. 
 37   Nakar, supra note 22, at 95.  
 38   Nakar, supra note 22, at 95.   
 39   Nakar, supra note 22, at 95.   
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feature of the human body.”40  Further, first generation biometrics relate to 
physiological data, such as fingerprints and facial recognition, whereas 
second generation biometrics have gone even further and are able to identify 
an individual based on behavioral patterns such as gait, keystroke analysis, 
and cognitive function.41  In order to successfully identify an individual, the 
biometric data collected must be a “measurable, robust and distinctive 
physical characteristic or personal trait.”42 
Lastly, and particularly important to its application to schools, FRT 
serves two basic functions: verification and identification.43  Verification 
works by using the technology in a one-to-one matching fashion.44  This, for 
example, is the process that the iPhone undergoes in order to unlock; once it 
detects the owner’s specific and stored faceprint, it opens.  Identification, on 
the other hand, occurs through a one-to-many search, where large databases 
are searched for a similar facial template to render a match.45  Thus, though 
Lockport has yet to introduce any set of protocols for their program, the 
system could potentially store any number of faceprints and program the 
building to only open certain doors upon verification, or uncover the 
identities of those who have committed minor offenses or crimes in the 
building.46 
Though the average individual may not believe that they have much 
experience with FRT outside of the commercial realm, the odds that they 
have been participants in a governmental FRT, albeit unknown and 
nonconsensual, are quite high.47  For example, the New York Department of 
Motor Vehicles has implemented an enhanced FRT system that already 
holds over 16 million photos in its database as a means of combatting identity 
theft and fraud.48  Additionally, police departments across the country have 
adopted FRT software in order to pursue and prosecute prostitutes, drug 
dealers, and other non-violent offenders.49  In fact, it has been estimated that 
FRT searches apply to more than 117 million American adults; a number 
that is continuously growing.50  This equates to approximately half of the 
 
 40   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 2. 
 41   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 2. 
 42   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 2. 
 43   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 56. 
 44   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 56. 
 45   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 56. 
 46   See generally, Associated Press, supra note 3. 
 47   See generally Nakar, supra note 22.   
 48   See Nakar, supra note 22, at 90. 
 49   See Nakar, supra note 22, at 97.   
 50   Georgetown Law, Half of All American Adults are in a Police Face Recognition 
Database, New Report Finds (Oct. 18, 2016), GEORGETOWN LAW, 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/half-of-all-american-adults-are-in-a-police-face-
recognition-database-new-report-finds. 
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adults in America having their photo identification in a facial recognition 
database.51 
B. Biometric Data Collection in American Schools 
While the introduction of FRT into schools is entirely novel, the 
collection of student biometric data is not.  As early as 2000, for example, 
Minnesota’s Eagan High School was using fingerprinting to manage the 
accounts of students borrowing books from its library.52  By 2013, a number 
of schools reported using iris scans in lieu of traditional school IDs as a way 
for students to “check in” when boarding school buses.53  The use of 
technology as a means to monitor students became so prevalent that by 
2013–14, 75% of all K-12 schools in the U.S. began using security 
cameras.54  In 2016, it was estimated that the collection of some form of 
biometric data, including fingerprinting, iris scans, palm scans, and radio 
frequency identification, was being collected from students in more than 
1,000 school districts in forty states throughout the U.S.55  In response to 
criticism of these techniques, most districts have recognized that, though a 
tradeoff of student privacy for efficiency and safety does exist, it is one worth 
making in the face of the unprecedented rates of terroristic threats and attacks 
in American schools.56 
As introduced at the start of this comment, the most recent and certainly 
the most aggressive development in the collection of student biometric data 
is currently unfolding in Lockport.57  On August 17, 2016, at the proceeding 
of the Board of Education, Lockport announced its proposal to use public 
funds to “upgrade” their current security cameras through SN 
Technologies.58  SN Technologies is a private, Ontario-based technology 
company that produces security systems specifically designed for school 
 
 51   Id.  
 52   Haydn Evan, The State of Biometric Technology: The Uses, The Concerns, LAW 360 
(August 8, 2017) https://www.law360.com/articles/950365/the-state-of-biometrics-
technology-the-uses-the-concerns.  
 53   Stefan P. Schropp, Biometric Data Collection and RFID Tracking in Schools: A 
Reasoned Approach to Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1068, 1073-74 
(2016) (citing Laurie Segall & Erika Fink, Iris Scans Are the New School IDs, CNN MONEY 
(July 11, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/11/technology/security/iris-scanning-
school).  
 54   J. William Tucker & Amelia Vance, School Surveillance; The Consequences for 
Equity and Privacy, 2 EDUCATION LEADERS REPORT 4, 3 (Oct. 2016) (citing a report conducted 
by the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE: 2013-2014 (2015)).  
 55   Schropp, supra note 53, at 1068. 
 56   See Schropp, supra note 53, at 1092. 
 57   Lockport Minutes, supra note 2.   
 58   Lockport Minutes, supra note 2.   
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security.59  Their mission is to use facial, shape, and pattern recognition 
technology specifically designed for the school sector to protect students and 
staff on school property.60  The system that the company uses in order to 
carry out this mission consists of three main functions: (1) it uses FRT to 
detect unwanted individuals (suspended students, fired employees, known 
gang members, those on the local sex offender registry, or other dangerous 
individuals that can be programed into the system); (2) it has the ability to 
detect gun shapes; and (3) it can review previously recorded videos in search 
of specific individuals.61 
Michael Vance, a representative of SN Technologies, addressed 
concerns about the new system’s use in Lockport by stating that the images 
and biometric data that is collected will reside and remain with the schools.62  
He assured those that expressed concerns the company does not “see” the 
collected data:  “[w]e don’t have access to the pictures, the video, anything 
like that.  It’s stored in the same way that school attendance databases, 
grades, records, everything is kept.”63  In terms of the potential for data to be 
shared with other public entities, school security consultant Tony Olivo 
stated, “The extent to which any security camera data will be shared with 
law enforcement agencies will be addressed in the final protocols, which will 
be guided by the interests of safety and security within the district and will 
be consistent with all applicable laws.”64  Lockport has stressed that they 
have used a surveillance system in their schools for over a decade and that 
the FRT is no more than a mere “upgrade” to their current system, one that 
will do nothing but further safeguard students against potential threats.65 
Moreover, the fact that emerging technology companies such as 
RealNetworks will begin offering free FRT systems to school districts 
nationwide, in combination with the inevitability that such technology will 
continue to develop and become more sophisticated and intrusive, furthers 
the need to critically analyze the potential harms that may accompany it. 
III. BALANCING POTENTIAL HARMS AND BENEFITS 
Children need to feel safe in order to thrive in the classroom.66  Studies 
conducted on K-12 students found that those who feel safe while in class 
 
 59   Associated Press, supra note 3. 
 60   See SN TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.sntechnologies.ca/product (last visited Jan. 16, 
2020). 
 61   Id.  
 62   Associated Press, supra note 3. 
 63   Associated Press, supra note 3.  
 64   Prohaska, supra note 1.  
 65   Associated Press, supra note 3.  
 66   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 5.   
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“have higher attendance rates, better academic performance, and may 
experience fewer classroom disruptions than other students.”67  Conversely, 
the effect of over-surveillance on learning has also been well-studied; 
findings of which demonstrate that it is accompanied by its own set of 
detrimental effects.68  The introduction of FRT not only increases the 
severity of previous surveillance concerns, but exposes students to a whole 
new host of privacy and data harms as well.  It is critical to balance such 
harms with the potential benefits in order to fairly assess the implementation 
of such a novel technology. 
A. Benefits: The Increasing Need for Safety in America’s Schools 
While adverse effects promulgated by organizations such as the 
NYCLU seem daunting, it is important to remember that they are merely 
predictions of what schoolwide FRT implementation may yield.  It would be 
irresponsible to not also recognize that FRT, if accompanied by the proper 
guidelines and limitations, has the potential to promote safety and efficiency 
for students.  In the public sector, FRT is cited by agencies such as the FBI 
as an effective tool used to thwart crime.69  For example, FRT has been 
effectively utilized by authority in order to track and capture terrorists, 
convict participants of prostitution, break up drug rings and locate missing 
persons.70 
In light of the increasing severity of violence that threatens students and 
faculty, FRT may ultimately prove to be beneficial as moderate levels of 
surveillance are “essential for the public good.”71  Private FRT companies 
that market their systems to school districts, such as RealNetworks and SN 
Technologies, advertise that the safety implications would be immense.72  
RealNetworks alleges that the technology would ensure that doors remain 
locked for individuals that are not programmed into the system, thus 
decreasing the overall likelihood that unwanted or dangerous individuals 
find their way in.73  The company also asserts that the system can be 
programmed to detect dangerous objects such as guns or other weapons.74  
Finally, they claim that all facial data and images are encrypted to ensure 
 
 67   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 7.  
 68   See Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9. 
 69   FBI Biometrics, supra note 34 at 93.  
 70   FBI Biometrics, supra note 34 at 93; Nakar, supra note 22, at 97.  
 71   DAVID WRIGHT & REINHARD KRESSL, SURVEILLANCE IN EUROPE 328 (David Wright 
& Reinhard Kressl eds., 2015).  
 72   SN TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 60; REAL NETWORKS, Safr for K-12 Schools, 
https://safr.com/k12 (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). 
 73   Webinar: Enhance School Safety with Secure, Accurate Facial Recognition (Real 
Networks 2018) (available at https://safr.com/k12).  
 74   Id.  
LOSARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2020  10:47 AM 
2020] FACEOFF 383 
privacy and that no images or data are ever transmitted over the internet.75 
Technology companies and the school districts to which they market 
seem to feel confident that they can ensure privacy while increasing safety 
and efficiency.76  However, identifying and analyzing the many harms and 
concerns of FRT is a crucial first step in ensuring that the appropriate 
measures be taken. 
B. Harms; Social implications and Privacy Concerns 
1. Normalizing Privacy Invasions and the “Surveillance Effect” 
One of the most alarming implications of FRT is the concern that it will 
normalize invasive means of surveillance in the eyes of students at a very 
young age.77  Experts have argued that the technology will breed a 
“generation that will be comfortable with and fully accepting of total 
government surveillance.”78  The idea of constant surveillance will likely 
have immense ramifications on the way students think about privacy and the 
government’s place in monitoring behavior in the interest of safety.79  If 
students are made to feel that authority figures essentially have a right to 
continuously monitor their actions, whether in a private place or not, it could 
normalize that notion as they enter adulthood. 
Another major concern with the implementation of FRT is a concept 
widely-known as the “surveillance effect.”80  The surveillance effect has 
been well-researched in American school systems since the emergence of 
security cameras as a means of monitoring K-12 students.81  The main notion 
is that students who feel as though they are being constantly watched will 
feel that they are in a “less nurturing, comfortable learning environment.”82  
Further, the surveillance-effect theorizes that the result of such a feeling 
interferes with the development of a sense of trust and cooperation at school 
between the students and the administration/faculty.83  Students that have 
been exposed to school climates that involve the extensive use of metal 
detectors, uniformed security guards, and surveillance cameras have shared 
 
 75   Id.  
 76   See e.g., SN TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 60. 
 77   See generally, Tucker & Vance, supra note 54. 
 78   Brian Heaton, State Legislatures Grapple with Biometrics Use in Schools, GOVTECH 
TODAY (April 5, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/State-Legislatures-Grappling-with-
Biometrics-Use-in-Schools.html.  
 79   Id.  
 80   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 8. 
 81   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 7. 
 82   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 8.  
 83   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 8. 
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their experiences about their interactions with such technology.84  Edward 
Ward, a student exposed to such an environment while attending high school 
in Chicago’s West Side recounted, “[f]rom the moment we stepped through 
the doors in the morning, we were faced with metal detectors, x-ray 
machines, and uniformed security guards. . . . I could slowly see the 
determination to get an education fade from the faces of my peers because 
they were convinced, they no longer mattered.”85 
Feelings of apathy witnessed by Ward will likely intensify with the 
addition of FRT into existing security cameras within schools that are 
already heavily monitored.  In addition to the general notion that they are 
being watched, students may also come to understand that their cameras have 
the capability to recognize who they are and specifically track them if 
deemed warranted.  For example, if a student has a history of misbehaving, 
the FRT software can keep an eye on him or her specifically throughout the 
school day in order to ensure obedience.86 
The ability to track individual students may also lead to a heightened 
penalization of minor offenses that would have otherwise gone unnoticed.87  
This is problematic because educational environments are meant to be spaces 
that facilitate growth and change among adolescents.88  It has been widely 
accepted that a certain degree of leniency and a small “margin of error” 
should generally be awarded to students, most of whom are grappling with 
their own sense of identity and simply striving to fit in with those around 
them.89  As adults, we recognize that children and teenagers are going to 
make mistakes; in fact, it is critical to their development and ability to 
mature.90  Experts argue that schools should remain, as they have always 
been, facilities of “human growth and development.”91  The existence of FRT 
and surveillance cameras fail to promote the notion of “forgiving and 
forgetting,” making students feel as though their minor misconducts will 
inevitably come back to haunt them.92  American schools have typically 
valued environments that ensure positive growth and change, even if through 
mistakes; therefore, the use of FRT in schools will likely erode these 
 
 84   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9.   
 85   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9 (citing Edward Ward, a DePaul University honor 
roll student, who shared his experience on the detrimental effects of over-surveillance 
growing up in one of the most heavily monitored schools in Chicago’s West Side).   
 86   See generally, Press Release, supra note 11.  
 87   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 12.  
 88   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9. 
 89   Generally, Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 8. 
 90   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9.   
 91   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9.   
 92   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 12. 
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fundamental concepts.93 
2. A Threat to Intellectual Privacy and Expression 
Additionally, FRT has the potential to infringe on intellectual privacy.94  
Experts in education have stressed that “[i]ntellectual privacy is the much-
needed protection for learning, reading and communicating that helps us 
make up our minds about the world on our own terms.”95  Intellectual privacy 
exists when students feel that they can express their thoughts, feelings, and 
ideas without feeling as though they are being watched or judged.96  When 
students feel they cannot express their thoughts and ideas, or when they feel 
their ideas may be recorded and stored, their thoughts and beliefs “get driven 
to boring, [to] the bland and the mainstream.”97  If a student is aware of the 
possibility that whatever they are saying or doing could theoretically be 
recorded and shared, it is quite likely that their creativity, risk-taking, and 
overall inquisitiveness will decrease while they are inside the classroom.98 
3. The Faultiness of FRT 
Another concern about implementing FRT is the fact that, though the 
technology has been around for decades, it is still largely in its infancy and 
the accuracy of systems similar to Lockport’s remains unknown.  For 
example, just last year, the South Whales Police Department released the 
results of an experiment that displayed the potentially immense 
shortcomings of FRT.99  At the Champions League’s final game, the police 
used FRT to log the identities of fans in the stadium; their system correctly 
logged 173 faces and wrongly identified 2,297 individuals.100  The system 
falsely identified approximately 92% of the participants.101  The police 
department defended the system, stating that it was created with the intention 
of locating one individual in a crowd rather than matching identities of the 
masses.102  The department also stated that it is continuing to improve upon 
 
 93   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9.   
 94   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9.   
 95   Neil Schoenherr, Intellectual Privacy Vital to Life in the Digital Age, THE SOURCE 
(Feb. 2, 2015), https://source.wustl.edu/2015/02/intellectual-privacy-vital-to-life-in-the-
digital-age (citing Neil Richards, member of the Advisory Board of the Future of Privacy 
Forum and a consult and expert in privacy law). 
 96   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9. 
 97   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9. 
 98   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 9.   
 99   Lily H. Newman, Facial Recognition Tech is Creepy when it Works and Creepier 
when it Doesn’t, WIRED (May 9, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-tech-
creepy-works-or-not.  
 100   Id.  
 101   Id.  
 102   Id.   
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the system’s overall accuracy.103  Nonetheless, the overwhelming number of 
false-positives that occurred is worrisome. 
Additionally, current systems have been known to generate false-
positives when an individual makes even minor aesthetic changes.104  For 
example, changes in hair, glasses, facial hair, and headscarves have been 
shown to “fool” the system.105  As K-12 children are likely to go through a 
plethora of different styles and natural physical changes, this will likely 
interfere with the system and has the potential to find innocent children at 
fault for acts that they may not have committed. 
Discrimination against people of color and women has also been 
explored in current FRT systems.106  Ethnic minorities are subject to a greater 
risk of inaccuracy due to the fact that many algorithms that compare facial 
templates skew or influence the types that are identified based on the 
databases that they are pulling from.107  For example, some programs draw 
from police databases that contain a disproportionate number of black and 
minority individuals.108  Further, there is already a racial disparity that exists 
in the classroom.109  Those who oppose the system worry that this technology 
has the potential to negatively affect, and unnecessarily worry students who 
come from immigrant backgrounds because of the possibility of data sharing 
with services such as immigration and customs enforcement.110 
4. Data Collection 
Finally, a major concern revolves around data management.  The 
biometric information taken from children exposed to FRT is highly 
sensitive.  If a student attends Lockport from K-12, the school will essentially 
have a faceprint of that child at each stage of their development.  Moreover, 
once the child is around eighteen, though they will naturally continue to 
develop, measurements such as their nose length, the space between their 
eyes and other biometric measurements are not likely to change.  If these 
biometric measurements are shared with government agencies and other 
third parties, they have the capability to be used as a virtual tracking device.  
Commercial threats and student data unknowingly being sold to third parties 
 
 103   Id.  
 104   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 64. 
 105   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 64. 
 106   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 64. 
 107   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 65. 
 108   SMITH ET AL., supra note 26, at 65. 
 109   Ava Kofman, Face Recognition is Now Being Used in Schools, but it won’t Stop Mass 
Shooting, THE INTERCEPT (May 30, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/05/30/face-
recognition-schools-school-shootings. 
 110   Id. 
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are just a few examples of how problematic this technology can become.111 
In light of all of these potential harms, the NYCLU has advocated for a 
complete rejection of FRT in schools.112  Others have agreed: “Imagine a 
technology that is so potently, uniquely dangerous . . . something so 
pernicious that regulation cannot adequately protect citizens from its 
effects.”113  The outcry from prominent groups such as the NYCLU and 
privacy experts alike should signal schools to proceed with great caution 
when considering the implementation of FRT, especially to provide 
safeguards necessary to protect students against its many projected, yet 
ultimately unknown harms. 
IV. STUDENT PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF FRT 
In an attempt to completely prevent these potential harms and the use 
of any FRT in Lockport, one of the major arguments that the NYCLU relies 
upon is the notion that the technology will infringe on the privacy rights of 
students.114  However, an analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions and 
state and federal regulations reveal an alarming lack of protection. 
A. Privacy Case Law 
It is unlikely that the use of FRT will be considered a violation of a 
student’s right to privacy under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
Though the Court has never faced this question head-on, an analysis of FRT 
cases read in conjunction with student privacy rights cases provides an 
appropriate framework. 
The Fourth Amendment, in its most basic sense, is meant to promote 
individual privacy by prohibiting the government from conducting 
unreasonable searches and seizures.115  A few prominent Supreme Court 
 
 111   The collection of biometric data and potential for commercial misuse has been written 
on extensively and a full discussion of it is outside the scope of this note.  See e.g., Alex 
Molnar, Faith Boninger & Ken M. Libby, Schoolhouse Commercialism Leaves Policymakers 
Behind, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR. (2014), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/trends-2013.pdf.   
 112   Press Release, supra note 11. 
 113   Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog, Professors Evan Selinger and Woodrow 
Hartzog Disclose the Privacy Risks of Facial Recognition, TAP, (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/July-2018/Professors-Evan-Selinger-and-Woodrow-
Hartzog-Discl.aspx; Facial Recognition Technology: Ensuring Transparency in Government 
Use: Statement for the Record Before the H. Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (statement by Kimberly J. Del Greco, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice 
Information Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).  As previously stated, this comment 
only very briefly touches on the issues associated with the data collection of school children. 
For a more in-depth discussion, see e.g., Schropp, supra note 53.   
 114   Curr, supra note 8 (advocating the NYCLU’s concerns regarding FRT in the Lockport 
schools and urging the District to cease their efforts). 
 115   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 10; U. S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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cases have addressed this right as it pertains to technology such as 
surveillance cameras, and a number of experts have drawn implications as to 
what an average citizen’s rights are in the wake of FRT.116  A monumental 
case in the realm of privacy is Katz v. United States.117  In Katz, a Supreme 
Court case that questioned the constitutionality of wire taps placed in phone 
booths, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, rather 
than areas, against unreasonable searches and seizures.118  In a recent 
summary of the law, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that, “even in the 
absence of trespass, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable.”119  The Court summarized that the search is 
deemed constitutional unless an individual exhibits an expectation of privacy 
and that expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable.120 
The court further illustrated this point in People v. Johnson,121 a 
California case that addressed the admissibility of FRT as evidence of 
identifying a guilty party.122  In Johnson, the court stated that, for trial 
purposes, whether FRT was used to identify an individual is ultimately 
irrelevant; the court viewed FRT as merely a database that provides law 
enforcement with an investigative tool.123  In most contexts, FRT takes place 
in areas and situations wherein the individual has little to no expectation of 
privacy such as open public spaces or street corners.124  The court then gave 
an example of a situation where a police unit uses FRT in order to capture a 
bank robber by comparing images of his face at the bank to images stored in 
a Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) database.125  In this example, the 
means of initial identification by FRT occurred in a public space where an 
individual is certainly not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy.126  
The court found the use of FRT essentially irrelevant so long as subsequent 
police protocols confirm the suspect.127  The case also suggests that courts 
recognize the faultiness of FRT, commenting that it matters not to their 
 
 116   Tucker & Vance, supra note 54, at 10.   
 117   Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 118   Id. at 351.  
 119   Nakar, supra note 22 (citing State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2012)). 
 120   Nakar, supra note 22. 
 121   People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 122   Nakar, supra note 22; see also id.  
 123   Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597. 
 124   Id. 
 125   Id.  
 126   Id.  
 127   Id.  
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analysis whether “facial recognition software is discerning and accurate 
enough to select the perpetrator.”128  Ultimately, though not explicitly stated, 
it appears the use of FRT does not run afoul to the Constitution in public 
settings. 
Children also enjoy a right to privacy, however, their rights as 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment are significantly lessened in the 
public school setting.129  In school settings, privacy protections are modified 
not only to impose responsibility on schools to keep children safe, but also 
schools have a legal duty to do so.130  The Supreme Court has indicated that 
public schools have a “custodial and tutelary responsibility” for the children 
that attend them and that such responsibilities cannot be disregarded or taken 
lightly.131  Additionally, Supreme Court cases over time have seemingly 
weakened the Fourth Amendment rights held by students.132 
In Brannum v. Overton County School Board,133 a case that will likely 
impact the use of FRT in schools, the Sixth Circuit specified reasonableness 
as it pertains to student searches conducted by surveillance cameras.134  In 
order to determine whether school searches are constitutionally reasonable, 
courts engage in a fact-specific balancing test.135  The Brannum Court 
balanced: (1) the government’s need to conduct the search against; (2) the 
nature of the invasion that the search entails; and (3) student’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.136 
Specifically, Brannum questioned whether or not the use of 
surveillance cameras placed in locker rooms violated a student’s 
Constitutional right to privacy.137  Ultimately, the court held that cameras 
placed in non-public locations—areas such as locker rooms where students 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy—violate the Fourth Amendment.138  
Further, in order to determine which spaces are protected, the case 
established a three-part framework: (1) the scope of legitimate expectation 
of privacy; (2) the character of the intrusion; and, (3) the nature and 
immediacy of governmental concern and the efficacy of the means employed 
for dealing with it.139 
 
 128   Id.  
 129   Schropp, supra note 53, at 1083-84.   
 130   Schropp, supra note 53, at 1083-84. 
 131   See e.g., Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). 
 132   Schropp supra 53, at 1077. 
 133   Brannum v. Overton County School Board, 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 134   See id. at 497. 
 135   See id. at 496. 
 136   Id. 
 137   Id. at 491-92. 
 138   Id. at 497. 
 139   Brannum, 516 F.3d at 496.  
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Using this same three-part framework, it is likely that a court faced with 
the question of whether FRT’s use in schools violates a student’s privacy 
right would hold that in most areas it does not.  In terms of the first element, 
a legitimate expectation of privacy, Lockport made it clear that the cameras 
are simply “upgrades” to their already-existing security camera.140  Thus, it 
is unlikely that the cameras will be moved to or placed in areas where 
students have an expectation of privacy, such as a restroom or a locker room.  
If the school’s cameras exist in hallways, lecture halls, and around exits and 
entrances, there will be no issue as to the first element. 
The second element, character of intrusion, is the prong that may 
potentially weaken a school’s ability to implement FRT under this standard.  
As FRT has yet to be used in a school context, its nature is difficult to define.  
FRT, and the biometric data that it collects, increases the severity of the 
intrusion.  Now, not only are schools collecting images of their students, but 
those images are being collected, stored, and analyzed.141  Courts may view 
FRT as a simple technological upgrade to security cameras and find it 
reasonable.  On the other hand, due to its novel ability to store and preserve 
biometric student data, a court may find it an unreasonable means of 
promoting safety.  In Brannum, the court provides guidance as to what 
constitutes a “justifiably intrusive search in light of purpose.”142  The court 
states that it finds the nature of video surveillance inherently intrusive; 
however, policies that the school put into action ensured that this intrusion 
was as minimally invasive as possible.143 
Finally, with respect to the third element, the nature and immediacy of 
governmental concern, schools such as Lockport have provided a sound 
rationale for FRT implementation as a means to combat violence in schools, 
which has dramatically increased in recent years.144  Schools will likely 
argue that the purpose of FRT, though it gathers highly sensitive data, is one 
of immediate concern because it is one of the newest ways to thwart attacks. 
The Brannum Court also held that “as the commonly understood 
expectation of privacy increases, the range and nature of permissible 
governmental intrusion decreased.”145  Using this logic, the pervasiveness of 
modern technology amongst younger generations will likely cause privacy 
 
 140   See Lockport Minutes, supra note 2.   
 141   Supra notes 1-2. 
 142   Brannum, 516 F.3d at 496.   
 143   Id. at 497. 
 144   See Andrea Page, Center for Homeland Defense and Security Releases 
Comprehensive Database of School Shootings in America, HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL 
LIBRARY, (last visited Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.hsdl.org/c/database-of-school-shootings-
in-america (reporting that 1,300 school shootings have occurred in America’s K-12 schools 
since 1970).  
 145   Brannum, 516 F.3d at 498. 
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expectations to diminish, inversely causing FRT’s range to increase and the 
nature of its function to gain acceptance.  Other means of biometric data 
collection have been practiced routinely by schools for decades, as outlined 
above.146  In terms of data collection and identification, fingerprint and iris 
scans may be considered on par with the collection of facial nodal points.147  
Due to the fact that it is unlikely that students will receive any protection 
from FRT under Constitutional law, it is necessary to look to federal and 
state regulation. 
B. State Regulations 
Although FRT is becoming increasingly prevalent in nearly all arenas 
of public life, few state laws currently regulate its use.148  Recently, however, 
a number of states have addressed the biometric data collection component 
of such technology in schools.149  For example, statutes in Illinois and 
Louisiana both “require that school systems receive permission” before 
collecting any biometric data; if the student is of legal age they must consent, 
and if the child is a minor, a parent must grant the school permission.150 
The Illinois statute defines biometric information as “any information 
that is collected through an identification process for individuals based on 
their unique behavioral or physiological characteristics, including 
fingerprint, hand geometry, voice, or facial recognition or iris or retinal 
scans.”151  The statute provides that school districts that intend to collect 
these forms of data must “adopt policies that require, at a minimum, all of 
the following: written permission from the individual who has legal custody 
of the student. . . or from the student if he or she has reached the age of 18.”152  
Similarly, the Louisiana law provides that administrations of each public 
elementary and secondary school that collects biometric information from 
students, “develop, adopt, and implement policies governing the collection 
and use of such information that, at a minimum, shall: require written 
permission from the student’s parent or other legal guardian, or the student 
if he or she is eighteen years of age or older.”153 
Apart from biometric data collection, certain areas of the country have 
taken a determinative stance against the use of FRT in the public section at 
 
 146   Supra notes 52-55. 
 147   Schropp, supra note 53.  
 148   See Heaton, supra note 78 . 
 149   Tiffany Lee, Biometrics and Disability Rights: Legal Compliance in Biometric 
Identification Programs, 2016 U.ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 209, 225 (2016). 
 150   Id. at 224-25. 
 151   Id. at 225 n.119. 
 152   Id.  
 153   Id. at 225 n.120. 
LOSARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2020  10:47 AM 
392 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
large.  Recently, San Francisco barred its police departments from using FRT 
software, joining two other cities, Oakland, California, and Somerville, 
Massachusetts.154  The New York Legislature has indicated that they are now 
considering a similar ban through the proposal of bill that will be 
reintroduced next year.155  The bill, sponsored by Monica P. Wallace, D-
Lancaster, would also impose a three-year moratorium on the use of FRT in 
schools until the NYSED completes a thorough study on the topic.156 
One solution in attempting to protect the privacy rights of children 
would be for other states to take notice of these few states, follow their lead, 
and perhaps expand upon the sentiments of their laws and proposed laws.  A 
more uniform and comprehensive solution to the problem, however, may 
exist in federal regulation. 
C. Federal Regulations 
The federal statutes that are cognizably applicable to FRT in schools 
and carry the potential for regulation include The Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”), and The Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (“PPRA”).  
Understanding how FERPA, COPPA, and the PPRA have developed and 
currently operate provides a better understanding of the shortcomings that 
exist and the need for stricter regulation.157 
Advocacy for amending these policies is not a new notion.  Policy 
makers at the highest level have taken note of the increasing tension that 
exists between the advancement of technology in the classroom and privacy, 
and civil liberty concerns.158  In 2014, for example, a White House Report 
urged Congress to “modernize the privacy regulatory framework under 
[FERPA] and [COPPA]” to combat data sharing and misuse while still 
allowing school technology and innovation to flourish.159 
The growing role of business in education is primarily responsible for 
this concern.160 It is widely acknowledged that “activities considered 
commercial . . . by some could be viewed as part of the adaptive learning 
 
 154   Thomas Prohaska, Lockport schools push to activate contentious facial recognition 
security system, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Aug. 10, 2019), 
https://buffalonews.com/2019/08/10/despite-opposition-lockport-school-leaders-push-for-
facial-recognition-security-system. 
 155   Id.  
 156   Id.  
 157   Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who is Reading Whom Now: Privacy in Education 
from Books to MOOCs, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 959 (2014). 
 158   Id. at 932. 
 159   Id. at 932 (citation omitted).   
 160   Id. at 949.   
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experience by others.”161  Even assuming the best of intentions, it is clear 
that market players are struggling to correctly balance commercial interests 
with student privacy rights.162  FRT deepens these concerns, as the private 
companies that provide the technology would be in possession of highly 
sensitive biometric data. 
In a slightly different vein, another overall area of weakness in these 
statutes is parental involvement; while the statutes are beneficial in requiring 
parental awareness, the average parent is often ill-positioned to take on such 
a task.163  Specifically, asking parents to consider and examine the details of 
such a system would likely do very little for both the privacy and data 
protection of their child.164 
The “opt-out” provisions of these statutes pose another problem in the 
face of FRT: when students and parents can “opt-out,” a “duplicative 
system” is essentially created.165  The school must then divide the technology 
amongst children who are able to enter and those who are not.  If this were 
to happen in the context of what Lockport is attempting to do, a duplicative 
system’s existence would completely thwart the entire purpose of the FRT 
cameras.  That is, Lockport’s system only works to identify threatening 
individuals when all faces are eligible to be scanned and compared to the 
school’s preexisting database. 
1. COPPA 
COPPA’s provisions exist solely to ensure that commercial companies 
obtain express parental consent prior to collecting children’s (under the age 
of thirteen) information while online.166  The statute plainly applies to 
commercial websites, online services directed at children, and websites and 
services that have actual knowledge that they collect personal information 
from children.167  An important provision of COPPA, however, is that 
schools retain the right to consent in lieu of a parent.168  Thus, while on its 
face the statute looks as though it may offer some form of protection as to 
FRT, it would be largely ineffective.  First, it would only have the potential 
to protect children under the age of 13, leaving a number of K-12 students 
unprotected.  Second, a school that is implementing the technology could 
simply consent to the data collection nullifying any potential protection. 
 
 161   Id. at 952. 
 162   Id. at 953. 
 163   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 957. 
 164   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 957. 
 165   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 957. 
 166   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 970. 
 167   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 970. 
 168   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 970. 
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2. PPRA 
Alternatively, the PPRA’s restrictions apply to school and third-party 
uses of student data to marketing explicitly.169  The PPRA requires school 
districts to notify parents in cases of collection, disclosure, use, or sale of 
student information for marketing purposes, and provides parents with the 
opportunity to opt their child out of such uses.170  Further, the statute applies 
to information that reveals “political affiliation, mental and psychological 
concerns, sex behaviors, and income.”171  Primarily, the PPRA was created 
in order to safeguard survey-like information collected at school from 
marketing purposes; it is unlikely that the PPRA would protect the disclosure 
of student biometric data from being shared with governmental agencies 
such as law enforcement and immigration agencies.172 
3. FERPA 
The most applicable of these three statutes is FERPA.  Passed in 1974, 
FERPA was created because prior to its existence, it was not clear which 
parties had access to student data and what rights parents had to their own 
child’s collected information.173  For example, a story praising a student for 
an athletic achievement could be easily published in the paper and list his or 
her weight, height, grades, and include a photograph of them for the general 
public to access without any consent granted from a parent or the student 
themselves.174  Additionally, it was relatively easy for police and health 
departments to access student data while parents and children were often 
denied access.175  This made it difficult to correct and challenge inaccurate 
or even stigmatizing information.176 
FERPA was born in wake of the Watergate scandal and grew out of 
concerns over government secrecy and the right to access data.177  Its purpose 
is to “protect the privacy of student education records.”178  The law applies 
to all schools that receive any funding that is considered applicable under the 
U.S. Department of Education.179  Further, under FERPA, parents and 
 
 169   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 972. 
 170   20 U.S.C. § 1232h(c)(2)(C)(i) (2012). 
 171   See generally, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h. 
 172   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, MODEL NOTIFICATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE 
PROTECTION OF PUPIL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (PPRA) (2014), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ppra/modelnotification.html.   
 173   Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 157, at 959. 
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eligible students (students over the age of eighteen) are granted certain rights 
in terms of data collection and review.180  FERPA is meant to promote 
privacy by preventing schools from needlessly and inappropriately releasing 
personal data to outside individuals and organizations.181 
V. AMENDING FERPA AS A MEANS OF MITIGATING FRT HARM 
In reviewing these three statutes, the most protection for students in the 
face of FRT exists under FERPA.  Though not a solution to every concern 
addressed in Part IV of this comment, amendments to FERPA may hold the 
most potential to mitigate harms.  In regard to social concerns, allowing 
students and parents the ability to review records and challenge disciplinary 
actions may alleviate negative effects of over-surveillance.  Amendments to 
FERPA may also promote biometric data security. 
The NYCLU’s letter to Lockport briefly mentions FRT’s potential 
FERPA violations.182  Commissioner Elia stated, “[s]tudent images are 
clearly a protected part of a student’s biometric record which is included in 
the definition of ‘personally identifiable information’ under FERPA.”183  In 
analyzing the protection of a student’s faceprint under FERPA, as the 
NYCLU suggests, it is also pertinent to interpret the definition of “education 
records.”  Under FERPA, student education records are defined as records 
that: (1) directly relate to a student; and (2) are maintained by an educational 
agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution.184  This 
definition suggests that FERPA only protects those documents affirmatively 
kept or collected by a school.185  Additionally, FERPA defines “personally 
identifiable information” to include direct identifiers and indirect 
identifiers.186  Direct identifiers include information such as student’s date 
of birth, place of birth, or mother’s maiden name.187  Indirect identifiers, on 
the other hand, are a catch-all category of sorts that includes “other 
information that, alone or in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific 
student that would allow a reasonable person in the school community. . . to 
identify the student with reasonable certainty.”188 
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This definition suggests biometric data should be protected; however, 
there are several clauses that significantly weaken the statute.  Mainly, 
FERPA authorizes the disclosures of student data without parental consent 
or opt-out rights in transactions related to the “educational function of the 
institution;” these transactions include sending information to “school 
officials,” other educational agencies, and federal and state authorities.189 
The “school officials” element of the 2009 FERPA amendment also 
includes vendors; thus,  so long as vendors are using information for 
designated educational purposes and act under school control, the transfer of 
the data is not in violation of FERPA’s provisions.190  This provision is what 
allows many technology vendors that work with schools to qualify as “school 
officials.”191  This is worrisome, especially with regards to FRT, as studies 
have found that commercial companies often fail to impose certain data 
deletion requirements that are mandated under FERPA.192 
FERPA has been heavily critiqued for its inability to impose any real 
sanctions on schools that violate its requirements.193  Critics of the law have 
stated that FERPA’s sanctions are “so implausible it has never been imposed 
in the 35-year history of the law.  That sanction is a withdrawal of all federal 
funds.  It will never happen.”194  Another one of FERPA’s shortcomings is 
the very fact that “authority” over the data transfers to the child once they 
turn eighteen.195  In the past, this provision did not pose a problem as data 
consisted mostly of areas such as disciplinary actions, a student’s transcript, 
and assessments of the student made by teachers.196  Now, however, 
advancements in technology have revolutionized data collection and storage, 
making data infinitely more sensitive.197 
Finally, the U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance 
Office has yet to offer formal guidance on how to determine if surveillance 
footage should be subsumed into FERPA.  While general video surveillance 
is not considered an education record, a video showing a student committing 
acts such as breaking into a locker or getting into a fight will become a 
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demerit if the school uses it for disciplinary purposes.198  Thus, it is 
questionable as to whether or not the biometric data collected would even be 
protected by FERPA unless it was capturing an act of discipline. 
In the face of inevitable FRT encroachment, perhaps the best precaution 
that can be taken is either an amendment to FERPA that specifically includes 
the use of FRT and biometric data, or the creation and implementation of a 
new regulation entirely.  Additionally, specific protocol should be defined in 
schools that choose to use FRT.  First, it should be made clear to students 
that the technology will be used solely for the purpose of safety and keeping 
those that are unwanted out of the building, rather than to monitor each child 
and punish them for minor offenses.  Second, Schools should also be 
prohibited from sharing the data collected with any and all third-party 
entities, independently ensure that the data is encrypted, and secure and 
impose some sort of mandatory data deletion after a certain amount of time 
has lapsed.  Last, schools should be encouraged to employ standards that are 
commonly promoted when standard surveillance cameras are used.199  
Concepts such as minimizing the amount of areas that host a camera, 
ensuring transparency and openness about the system, and properly training 
the staff who will ultimately work the technology would be highly 
beneficial.200  Transparency and openness about the system should also be 
conveyed to students and faculty.  If the proper procedures are followed and 
federal regulations can timely catch up with the technology, FRT may be an 
effective and vigorous means of safety for modern American schools. 201 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current installation of FRT in the Lockport School District has 
illuminated a Fourth Amendment right to privacy issue that has been 
steeping in American public schools for decades. Further, it is clear that 
through the means of commercial tech-companies, FRT will become more 
accessible and will be implemented in schools nationwide in time.  Though 
the NYCLU has proposed that the activity come to a full-halt due to the 
unconstitutionality of the FRT systems, it is unlikely that current 
jurisprudence or regulatory schemes will offer much protection to students.  
In order to affirmatively ensure students are protected, it is crucial that the 
federal government begin to either amend pre-existing Acts such as FERPA 
or create new ones entirely. 
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